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Abstract: There have been over 80 field experiments on traditional dimensions of discrimination 
in labor and housing markets since 2000, in 23 countries. These studies nearly always find 
evidence of discrimination against minorities. However, the estimates of discrimination in these 
studies can be biased if there is differential variation in the unobservable determinants of 
productivity or quality of majority and minority groups, so it is possible that this experimental 
literature as a whole overstates the evidence of discrimination. We re-assess the evidence from 
the 10 existing studies of discrimination that have sufficient information to correct for this bias. 
For the housing market studies, the estimated effect of discrimination is robust to this correction. 
For the labor market studies, in contrast, the evidence is less robust, as just over half of the 
estimates of discrimination either fall to near zero, become statistically insignificant, or change 
sign. 
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Field experiments – specifically, audit or correspondence studies – have been used 
extensively to test for discrimination in markets. In audit studies of labor market discrimination, 
fake job candidates (“testers”) of different races, ethnicities, etc., who are sometimes actors, are 
sent to interview for jobs (or in some early studies, apply by telephone). The candidates have 
similar resumes and are often trained to act, speak, and dress similarly. Correspondence studies, 
in contrast, use fictitious job applicants who exist on paper only (or now, electronically), and 
differ systematically only on group membership. The response captured in correspondence 
studies is a “call-back” for an interview or a closely related positive response. In contrast, the 
final outcome in audit studies is actual job offers. Differences in outcomes between groups are 
likely attributable to discrimination, although there are, naturally, some subtle issues of 
interpretation – including the fact that such differences can be attributable to either taste 
discrimination or statistical discrimination.  
Audit and correspondence (AC) studies have also been used to study discrimination in 
housing markets. In audit studies, the testers of different races, ethnicities, etc., are sent to 
inquire about properties for rent or sale. In correspondence studies the fictitious inquiry is 
submitted electronically, applying online to advertised properties for rent or sale.  
The large literature using AC studies to test for discrimination in labor markets and 
housing markets leads to remarkably consistent findings.  Nearly every study focusing on race or 
ethnicity finds evidence of race or ethnic discrimination in labor or housing market, and the 
conclusions of the smaller number of studies of sexual orientation discrimination are equally 
consistent.   
The question we ask in this paper is whether this near-uniform evidence of 
discrimination from field experiments is an accurate reflection of discriminatory behavior, 
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supporting a conclusion that discrimination really is this consistent and pervasive. The question 
might seem misplaced, as AC studies are widely regarded as providing more rigorous evidence 
on discrimination than can be obtained from non-experimental evidence in which group 
membership may be correlated with unobservables. However, a particularly challenging critique 
of AC studies (the “Heckman-Siegelman critique”) is that, the resulting estimate of 
discrimination can be biased in either direction – or equivalently, discrimination can be 
unidentified. This problem arises when the variances of the unobservables differ across the 
groups studied. Moreover, such a difference in variances – and the bias it creates – cannot be 
ruled out or easily controlled in AC studies, and most of the past literature using AC studies has 
simply ignored the problem.   
There is a method to correct AC studies for bias from differences in the variance of 
unobservables. This method requires more and different kinds of data than AC studies typically 
collect. However, we have identified 10 studies of discrimination against minorities in labor and 
housing markets that do include the requisite data.  We re-examine the data from these studies to 
test whether this evidence is robust to confronting the data with the Heckman-Siegelman 
critique. Specifically, implementing the correction for bias from differences in the variances of 
unobservables across groups, do these studies still uniformly point to discrimination?  
To summarize the results briefly, for the housing market studies the estimated effects of 
discrimination are robust to this correction. For the labor market studies, in contrast, the 
evidence is less robust; in about half of the cases covered in these studies, the estimated effect of 
discrimination either falls to near zero or becomes statistically insignificant, and in one the sign 
changes. The results for the labor market, in particular, suggest that researchers need to build 
into future AC studies the data and experimental design needed to address the Heckman-
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Siegelman critique, and that further work on different ways to eliminate bias from AC studies 
estimates of discrimination is warranted. More substantively, our re-examination of the evidence 
suggests that the overall body of experimental evidence on labor market discrimination provides 
a less clear signal of discrimination than one would draw from the results reported in the existing 
studies.  
Key background literature 
AC studies are widely regarded as providing more rigorous evidence on discrimination 
than can be obtained from non-experimental evidence in which group membership may be 
correlated with unobservables.1 However, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998) 
show that, in the standard implementation, estimates of discrimination from AC studies can be 
biased in either direction – or equivalently, discrimination can be unidentified. This problem 
arises not under some unusual or unlikely theoretical conditions. Rather, it arises under an 
assumption that is at the core of early models of statistical discrimination (Aigner and Cain, 
1977) – that the variances of the unobservables differ across the groups studied. This criticism of 
evidence from AC studies – which we refer to as the “Heckman-Siegelman critique” – holds 
even under quite ideal conditions (detailed later) in which other potential research design flaws 
that Heckman and Siegelman discuss are absent.  
             A statistical method that can lead to unbiased estimates of discrimination using data from 
AC studies, relying on identifying assumption, was proposed in Neumark (2012). As explained 
below, most past AC studies do not have the requisite data, which are applicant or other 
                                                 
 
1 The methods and empirical findings from these studies have been reviewed by Pager (2007), 
Riach and Rich (2002), Rich (2014), and Neumark (2016). There are, additionally, similar 
studies of discrimination in consumer markets (e.g., Doleac and Stein, 2013).  
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characteristics aside from the group identifier that shift the probability of call-backs or hires. 
However, we have identified 10 studies of discrimination against minorities (based on race, 
ethnicity, or sexual orientation) in labor and housing markets conducted over the last couple of 
decades that do include the requisite data.2  
These 10 studies – just like nearly all of the far greater number of AC studies that do not 
have the requisite data – find evidence of discrimination against ethnic or racial minorities, 
immigrants, or gays and lesbians.3 We have obtained the original data from the authors of these 
studies, and our goal in this paper is to test whether this evidence is robust to confronting the 
data with the Heckman-Siegelman critique. Specifically, implementing the correction for bias 
from differences in the variances of unobservables across groups, do these studies still uniformly 
point to discrimination?  
Some very recent AC studies have implemented this bias correction.4 Our goal in this 
paper is to revisit past studies that do not address the Heckman-Siegelman critique, to assess 
whether the near-uniform findings of discrimination from the large body of past research is 
robust to addressing this critique. We cannot re-examine all such studies. But we do, we believe, 
re-examine the complete set of such studies that focus on traditional dimensions of 
discrimination and have (accessible) the data required to address this critique. 
                                                 
 
2 The studies are: Ahmed et al. (2010); Baert et al. (2015); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) – 
the data used in Neumark (2012); Bosch et al. (2010); Carlsson and Eriksson (2014); Carlsson 
and Rooth (2007); Drydakis (2014); Ewens et al. (2014); Lee and Khalid (2016); and Oreopoulos 
(2011).     
3 For the most recent review of a large number of AC studies, see Neumark (2016). 
4 See Baert (2014, 2015, 2016), Carlsson et al. (2013), Neumark et al. (2015), and Nunley et al. 
(2015). Baert and Verhofstadt (2015) also do this, although in relation to criminal background 
(juvenile delinquency), which is outside the scope of discrimination studies covered in the 
present paper.   
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The field experiments covered in this paper 
 The field experiments re-analyzed in this paper are one of three broad types: studies of 
ethnic/immigrant or race discrimination in labor markets; studies of sexual orientation 
discrimination in labor markets; and studies of ethnic/immigrant or race discrimination in rental 
housing markets. Many of the details and results of these studies are discussed in Rich (2014) and 
Neumark (2016). Here we focus only on what is essential to understand the analysis of bias from 
differences in unobservables that we implement in this paper. Readers interested in more details on 
these specific studies, and the techniques used more generally, should see our surveys (or of 
course the original papers). We do not go into more detail because our goal in this paper is not to 
compare or critique other dimensions of these studies, but rather just to consider the robustness of 
the conclusions to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique.5   
What distinguishes these 10 studies from the others in the literature is that they use 
applicants distinguished not only by race, ethnicity (including immigrant origin), or sexual 
orientation, but also by different levels of qualifications. In these studies, this was done to ask, in a 
general way, whether the evidence of discrimination by ethnicity, race, or sexual orientation 
differed for applicants with different levels of qualifications.6 As discussed in the next section, 
                                                 
 
5 There are also field experiments investigating differences in hiring outcomes based on other 
characteristics, such as criminal background, mental or physical illness, facial attractiveness, 
veteran status, or socio-economic background or class. While these kinds of differences are not 
the focus of our paper (even though some could be interpreted as discrimination), the 
experimental designs in these papers do not generate the data needed to implement this empirical 
method, with the exception of Baert and Balcaen (2013), who implement this method in relation 
to differential treatment based on military service, and find no evidence of bias from differences 
in the variances of unobservables.    
6 The first study of this type (Jowell and Prescott-Clarke, 1970) considered this issue. The study 
compared job offer outcomes for immigrant versus white British applicants, and gave half the 
applications in each group higher qualifications with regard to education. (There was also 
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however, the availability of data with variation in applicant qualifications is exactly what is needed 
to implement the empirical method that addresses the Heckman-Siegelman critique.   
Baert et al. (2015), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Carlsson and Rooth (2007), 
Drydakis (2014), and Lee and Khalid (2016) all used matched pairs (sets) of applicants, with two 
(or more) applications sent to each job vacancy. Oreopoulos (2011) considered differences for 
many different ethnic groups (relative to native Canadians), in some cases also signaling 
immigrant status, and sent multiple resumes for each job vacancy. Across these studies, on the 
resumes used, which were either real resumes the authors found or resumes generated randomly 
from elements of other resumes, race or ethnicity was signalled by name, and immigrant status in 
addition to ethnicity was sometimes further signalled by education or work experience in a foreign 
country (Oreopoulos, 2011). Sexual orientation was signalled by participation in an organization 
active on behalf of the gay community or a gay organization.  
There have been fewer studies of discrimination in housing markets in the broader 
literature. In the housing market experiments we re-examine, only Bosch et al. (2010) used 
matched pairs, while the other three (Ahmed et al., 2010; Ewens et al., 2014; Carlsson and 
Eriksson, 2014) sent a single rental enquiry. An accompanying message providing details on the 
applicant was attached, in which the researchers manipulated the information provided – ethnicity 
and race, as well as other qualifications or the applicant’s job, which indicated ability to pay. In 
these studies, signaling is done by name, although Bosch et al. (2010) interpret their results for 
Moroccan versus Spanish names as measuring discrimination against immigrants. 
                                                 
 
variation among the immigrants only in whether they were English-speaking and whether 
secondary education was in Britain, although this kind of variation that does not apply equally to 
majority and minority groups is not as useful.) The more recent studies with such data that we re-
examine in the present paper are those for which we could recover the data from authors.  
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          Other qualifications also varied across the resumes or applications – and this variation in 
qualifications is essential for implementing the correction for bias from differences in variances 
of unobservables.  The variables used in each study are described in Tables 2A, 2B, and 3, which 
report our results from re-analyzing the data from these studies (discussed in detail below). For 
example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) generally sent four applications to each job. They 
created two matched pairs of applicants, one with low-quality background and another pair with 
high-quality background. The quality of the applicant varied based on labor market experience, 
career profiles, employment history, and skills such as employment experience gained either 
over summer or while at school, volunteering, extra computer skills, certification degrees, 
foreign language skills, honors, or some military experience. Carlsson and Rooth (2007) 
signalled similar additional information on applicants as Bertrand and Mullainathan, as well as 
different spells of unemployment, work experience over the summer, overqualified or not, 
personality traits, and cultural and sporting activities listed as hobbies and interests. Oreopoulos 
(2011) varied the information provided on the extent of foreign education and foreign experience 
as well as language skills and certification and masters degrees. Drydakis (2014) used an 
accompanying cover letter to provide more favorable information about applicants in some 
cases, including mentioning grades, previous job responsibilities and tasks, and personality 
characteristics associated with work commitment; these same applicants also included letters of 
references that more strongly signalled positive work traits such as teamwork and loyalty to the 
firm. Lee and Khalid (2016) varied factors such as private versus public university, grades, and 
English proficiency.  
In the housing market tests, researchers manipulated the information on the applicant, 
using an accompanying message, to explore the impact of basic, negative, or positive 
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information – such as habits (smoking, exercise, and nightclub attendance, in Carlsson and 
Eriksson, 2007), variation in smoking and credit rating (in Ewens et al., 2014), and information 
on positive characteristics like work history, education, lack of payment complaints, etc. (Ahmed 
et al., 2010) or stable occupations and contracts (Bosch et al., 2010).   
          The richness and number of qualifications that researchers chose to vary across the 
applicants differ quite a bit across these studies. For the labor market studies, these qualifications 
generally pertain to education, experience, and skills, but sometimes extend to attempts to convey 
something about the applicant’s personality or hobbies, the order of the application, and other 
things. One of the housing studies (Carlsson and Eriksson, 2014) tries to provide information on 
the applicant’s lifestyle, which could be relevant to a potential landlord. We do not discuss the 
different qualifications used in each study in detail, but list them for each study in the tables 
reporting the statistical analysis (Tables 2A and 2B for the labor market studies, and Table 3 for 
the housing market studies). The reader will note that we also list other features of the ads that 
could affect the probability of a call-back – such as characteristics of the job or the apartment. We 
include these because – as explained in the next section – the statistical method is informed by 
differences in the coefficients between the two groups studied in any of the factors that can affect 
call-backs.   
Findings from the field experiments covered in this paper 
Table 1 summarizes the conventional results from the 10 studies we re-examine, as well as 
giving basic information about them, including the years covered, the groups covered, and the 
outcomes. The original studies report results in different ways, varying between chi-square/Fisher 
exact tests, binomial tests, or tests of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the call-back 
rate between the groups, typically controlling for other aspects of the resumes. However, here we 
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report results on a consistent basis for all studies – marginal effects from probit models using the 
full set of resume characteristics included in the data – which we have estimated from data 
provided by the authors of these studies.7  
[Table 1 near here] 
As reported in Table 1, the six labor market experiments covered in Panel A all find 
statistically significant evidence of discrimination against either ethnic minorities, blacks, or gays 
and lesbians. The estimated differentials by racial and ethnic groups are in the same range – an 
approximately 0.03 to 0.15 lower probability of a call-back. These are on somewhat different 
baseline rates of call-backs, but the call-back rates also do not vary that much across these 
studies.8 The two estimates from Drydakis (2014), for discrimination against gays and lesbians in 
Cyprus, are much larger (although the baseline call-back rates are much higher too).  
The four housing market studies similarly find consistent evidence of discrimination 
against minorities. The range of estimates is fairly tight (a 0.09 to 0.17 lower call-back rate). Thus, 
every one of these studies points to evidence of discrimination against the minority group.  
The conclusions from these studies strongly echo the broader literature, in which nearly 
every study finds evidence of discrimination in labor or housing market on the basis of race or 
ethnicity (Rich, 2014; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016; Neumark, 2016; Quillian et al., forthcoming), as 
do the smaller number of studies of discrimination based on sexual orientation (Neumark, 2016). 
The question this paper addresses is whether this near-uniform evidence of discrimination from 
                                                 
 
7 Details on the control variables, the standard errors, etc., are provided in tables discussed 
below. Not surprisingly, the results in Table 1 closely parallel the conclusions of the original 
papers – however they report their results – although they are not always identical.    
8 One might wonder about apparent evidence of discrimination against British immigrants in 
Canada; indeed, we will see in implementing the correction for the Heckman-Siegelman critique 
below that this evidence appears to be spurious.  
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field experiments is an accurate reflection of discriminatory behavior, supporting a conclusion that 
discrimination really is this consistent and pervasive, or whether the evidence in at least some of 
these studies might reflect biases stemming from differences in the variance of unobservables 
across groups – the problem highlighted by the Heckman-Siegelman critique.  
Some of the studies also include female and male applicants, or more broadly test for 
discrimination along multiple dimensions, including sex and age (Carlsson and Eriksson, 2014). 
We do not focus, in this paper, on evidence on discrimination based on sex or age. The broader 
literature focuses far more on race and ethnicity (and more recently on sexual orientation), and – 
as we have noted – delivers a near-uniform finding of discrimination against minorities. The 
evidence of sex discrimination is less robust, and tends to point less to discrimination against 
women, and more to the importance of sex norms for jobs in whether male or female applicants 
received more call-backs (Neumark, 2016). And recent evidence from a large-scale 
correspondence study of age discrimination yields ambiguous results for men, but not women 
(Neumark et al., 2016). 
We next provide a brief discussion of the approach used to correct for the bias in estimates 
of discrimination from the standard field experiment design, and then present our re-examination 
of the data from the 10 studies we have identified that have the requisite data to implement the 
method in Neumark (2012) to correct the estimates for bias from differences in the variances of 
unobservables.  
Addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique 
There are quite a few critiques of AC studies aside from the one we focus on here. Most 
of them are laid out in Heckman and Siegelman (1993), and discussed further in Neumark (2012) 
in the context of the framework laid out in this section. Some of the more important critiques – 
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such as the possibility of “experimenter effects,” and small differences between applicants that 
can matter a lot when applicants are matched on so many characteristics – can be addressed by 
using correspondence studies instead of audit studies, and indeed most recent research uses the 
correspondence study technique. The Heckman-Siegelman critique is of particular importance 
because it applies equally well to correspondence studies, even under otherwise ideal conditions 
such as no mean differences in unobservables between groups, but only differences in the 
variances of unobservables. And this critique is salient because nothing in the research design 
rules out differences in the variances of unobservables, and indeed – as noted earlier – these 
differences are foundational in models of statistical discrimination. We first lay out a basic 
framework for the analysis of data from an audit or correspondence study, and then explain the 
bias and the correction.9  
Non-experimental regression-based approaches testing for and measuring discrimination 
use data on the groups in question in a population, introducing regression controls to try to 
remove the influence of group differences in the population that can affect outcomes (Altonji and 
Blank, 1999). Correspondence (and audit) studies, in contrast, create an artificial pool of labor 
market participants among whom there are supposed to be no average differences by group. This 
is clearly a potentially powerful strategy, because if we have, e.g., a sample of blacks and whites 
who are identical on average, because race is randomly assigned to a subset of similar resumes, 
then in a regression of the form 
Y = α + βB + ε ,          (1) 
                                                 
 
9 This section draws heavily on Neumark (2012), while avoiding many details that a reader can 
find in that paper.  
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where Y is the outcome and B is a dummy variable for blacks, ε is uncorrelated with B, so that 
the OLS estimate ?̂?𝛽 (or simply the mean difference in Y) provides an estimate of the effect of 
race discrimination on Y.10   
Of course, most of the earlier regression studies focus on wages, whereas AC studies 
focus on hiring. If an employer is free to pay a lower wage to blacks, for example, then in the 
context of the Becker employer discrimination model, why discriminate in hiring? One common 
interpretation is that there is an equal wage constraint – perhaps due to a minimum wage, or 
because anti-discrimination laws are more effective at rooting out wage discrimination than 
hiring discrimination. Alternatively, in the simple model, employers with stronger discriminatory 
tastes than the marginal employer will discriminate in hiring. As we make clear below, however, 
this framework does not only detect taste discrimination à la Becker.   
To provide a more formal framework, suppose that productivity depends on two 
individual characteristics (standing in for a larger set of relevant characteristics), X’ = (XI, XII), so 
that productivity is P(X’). XI is what the firm observes, and XII is unobserved by firms. It is 
simplest, for now, to think of Y as continuous, such as the wage offered, although in fact in AC 
studies we should think of it as latent productivity leading to a decision to hire/call-back or not.  
Define discrimination as 
Y(P(X’), B=1) ≠ Y(P(X’), B=0) .                  (2) 
Assume that P(.,.) is additive, so 
P(X’) = βIXI + XII,         (3) 
where the coefficient of XII is normalized to one as it is unobservable, and 
                                                 
 
10 For simplicity, the discussion here is couched solely in terms of blacks and whites. 
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Y(P(X’), B) = P + γB.         (4)      
Discrimination against blacks implies that γ  < 0, so that blacks are paid less than or 
perceived as less productive than whites who are actually equally productive. 
In correspondence studies, researchers create resumes that standardize the productivity of 
applicants at some level. Denote expected productivity for blacks and whites, based on what the 
firm observes, as PB* and PW*. Y is observed for each tester, so each test – the outcome of 
applications to a firm by one black and one white tester/applicant – yields an observation  
Y(PB*, B = 1) − Y(PW*, B = 0) = PB* + γ − PW* .     (5) 
Given that the correspondence study design sets PB* = PW*, we should be able to estimate 
γ easily from these data, by simply running a regression of Y on the dummy variable B and a 
constant. (Some potential complications are discussed in Neumark, 2012). 
A correspondence study can preclude systematic differences between groups in 
observables and experimenter effects. But there can still be assumed differences in means 
between groups despite the groups using matched resumes. In equation (5) above, PB* = E(βIXBI 
+ XBII|XBI, B = 1), and similarly for PW*. Assuming randomization, and with XBI = XWI = XI, the 
right-hand side of equation (5) reduces to γ  + E(XBII|XI, B = 1) − E(XWII|XI, B = 0), implying that 
we only identify γ if E(XBII|XI, B = 1) = E(XWII|XI, B = 0). Employers may have different 
expectations about the mean of XII for blacks and whites, conditional on what they observe, 
which a labor economist would label statistical discrimination. Although economists are 
interested in distinguishing between statistical and taste discrimination, both are illegal under 
U.S. law and both also appear to be illegal under European Union law.11 Moreover, it is 
                                                 
 
11 As discussed in Neumark (2016), the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (29, § 1604.2) defines 
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challenging to distinguish between the two models. Thus, this issue is put aside, and the 
discrimination estimates from the studies considered in this paper interpreted as the sums of taste 
and statistical discrimination.12    
That is not to suggest that researchers using AC methods have not tried to distinguish 
between taste and statistical discrimination. The idea exploited in most studies is that when the 
applications include a richer set of applicant characteristics, it is less likely that statistical 
discrimination plays much of a role in group differences in outcomes (e.g., Ewens et al., 2014). 
Effectively, one tries to eliminate the term E(XBII|XI, B = 1) − E(XWII|XI, B = 0) from the estimated 
difference in hiring rates to see how much of the overall difference in hiring rates is accounted 
for by this difference in expectations, which corresponds to statistical discrimination.13  
Oreopoulos (2011) and Ewens et al. present perhaps the most thorough attempts at 
discerning between these hypotheses about discrimination in AC studies. Oreopoulos uses the 
approach of adding information (e.g., on country of education, to signal English language skills) 
to see whether estimated hiring gaps fall, as well as examining differences in hiring gaps for 
                                                 
 
as illegal discrimination “The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of 
coworkers, the employer, clients or customers …”  But it also states “The principle of 
nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities 
and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group. There is not as 
explicit a prohibition of statistical discrimination in the European Union (EU). Article 2 of the 
EU’s Directive 2000/43/EC prohibits both “direct” and “indirect” discrimination, but these 
appear to line up, respectively, with disparate treatment and disparate impact in the U.S. context 
(see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0043, viewed 
December 2, 2015). However, other material suggests that statistical discrimination is covered by 
direct discrimination (OECD, 2013, p. 195). 
12 Indeed, it seems that we could also include implicit discrimination (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2005). 
Implicit discrimination posits a different reason for undervaluing the productivity of a group of 
workers, which can lead to different policy levers to combat it. But if it arises when employers 
evaluate applicants in AC studies, the empirical implication for the framework developed here 
would likely be the same as the implication of taste discrimination. 
13 Neumark (2016) provides many examples, and also some criticisms of this approach. 
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occupations across which the importance of statistical discrimination likely varies. In many 
cases, he does not find evidence consistent with statistical discrimination, despite evidence from 
a survey of participating employers that they used name, or country of education or experience, 
as a signal of potential language problems.  
Ewens et al. (2014) specifically allow for the mean and variances of unobservables to 
differ across groups (as in Aigner and Cain, 1977), and examine whether the differential 
treatment by race is more consistent with statistical discrimination (both first- and second-
moment) or taste-based discrimination. Although they do not correct for differences in variances 
of unobservables, they demonstrate that group differences in outcomes may decrease when more 
information is provided and they argue that the evidence is consistent with statistical 
discrimination. In particular, they demonstrate that the differences in outcomes across groups 
vary with the differences in racial composition across neighborhoods in a way that is consistent 
with the hypothesized differences in variances of unobservables across groups. 
One could presumably use the method described below for resumes with varying 
amounts of information, to recover unbiased estimates under different information treatments 
and hence try to gauge the relative importance of taste and statistical discrimination. However, 
this issue is not the focus of our analysis in this paper. Instead, our focus is re-examining the 10 
studies identified earlier and investigating whether the uniform evidence of discrimination from 
these studies persists once account is taken of the Heckman-Siegelman critique. 
 The issue raised by the Heckman-Siegelman critique arises from the potential for 
differences across groups in the variances of the unobservables – which is equally problematic 
even in the ideal condition of no assumed mean difference. To see how the difference in 
variances can drive differences in the results of the analysis of data from an AC study, it is most 
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natural to think of equation (1) as a latent variable model for productivity, with applicants having 
to exceed some productivity threshold with sufficiently high probability (where α in equation (1) 
can also include observables that vary across individuals that affect productivity, which we have 
denoted XI).  
To isolate the problem, consider the best-case scenario where E(XBII|XI, B = 1) = 
E(XWII|XI, B = 0) – i.e., there is no statistical discrimination regarding levels. But the standard 
deviations of the unobservables, denoted σBII and σWII, need not be equal.14   
Assume the applicant is called back (hired) if there is a sufficiently high probability that 
their productivity exceeds a given threshold. In this case, the inequality σBII ≠ σWII combined 
with the design of AC studies results in a biased estimate of discrimination; worse, we cannot 
necessarily even sign the bias.   
To see the intuition, recall that the key feature of the usual design of AC studies is using 
similar resumes on the applicants in different groups. This requires choosing a particular level of 
the quality of the resumes. Suppose, for example, that the research design standardizes XI at a 
low level, denoted XI*. Employers care about how likely it is that the sum βIXI + XII exceeds 
some threshold. Given the low value XI*, this is more likely for a group with a high variance of 
XII. Thus, even in the case of no discrimination (γ = 0), the employer will favor the high-variance 
group. Conversely, if standardization is at a high level of XI*, the employer will favor the low-
variance group. Because researchers do not have information on the population of real applicants 
to the jobs studied, there is no definitive way to know whether XI* is high or low relative to the 
actual distribution, and hence no way to sign the bias. As discussed in more detail below, note 
                                                 
 
14 Neumark assumes homoscedasticity within groups, and thus suppresses conditioning on XBI 
and XWI. 
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that the variances of unobservables affect which group gets more call-backs only because of the 
research design standardizing the resumes at a particular level (when the level of standardization 
is not at the central tendency of the distribution).   
The technique developed in Neumark (2012) to correct for the bias from differences in 
the variances of unobservable characteristics relies on the experimental study having extra 
information that explores the impact of different productivity or quality characteristics (creating 
applicants who have different levels of qualifications, for example). As long as some of these 
characteristics have the same effects in the latent variable model for the probability of an offer – 
the key identifying assumption – this extra information allows the effect of the difference in 
variances between the groups’ unobserved characteristics on the responses to be isolated from 
the role of discrimination in evaluating applicants. That is, it allows separate identification of the 
relative variances in the unobservables and the discrimination coefficient, γ.15  
It is rare that correspondence studies include variables that shift the call-back probability, 
because these studies typically create one “type” of applicant for which there is only random 
variation in characteristics that are not intended to affect outcomes. However, the 10 studies 
discussed in Section 2 have this information – as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), whose 
data Neumark (2012) used to illustrate this method for correcting for the bias in AC studies. 
Applying this method to the studies re-examined in this paper therefore allows us to determine 
whether the measures of discrimination from conventional analyses of the data in these studies 
                                                 
 
15 To reiterate, for the purposes of simplification, it is assumed E(XBII|XI, B = 1) = E(XWII|XI, B = 
0). Without this assumption, references to γ in the remainder of this section should be read as 
references to γ + E(XBII|XI, B = 1) = E(XWII|XI, B = 0) – i.e., the sum of taste and statistical 
discrimination. 
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provided unbiased estimates of discrimination, or instead either overstated or understated 
discrimination.16  
The intuition behind the solution stems from the fact that a higher variance for one group 
(say, whites) implies a smaller effect of observed characteristics on the probability that a white 
applicant meets the standard for hiring. Thus, information from a correspondence study on how 
variation in observable qualifications is related to call-backs can be informative about the 
relative variance of the unobservables, and this, in turn, can identify the effect of discrimination. 
Based on this idea, the identification problem identified by the Heckman-Siegelman critique is 
solved by invoking an identifying assumption – specifically, that the effect of applicant 
characteristics that affect perceived productivity and hence call-backs have equal effects across 
groups – along with the testable requirement that some applicant characteristics affect the call-
back probability (since if all the effects are zero we cannot learn about σBII/σWII from these 
coefficient estimates). 
In a probit specification, for example, we know that we can only identify the coefficients 
of the latent variable model for productivity relative to the standard deviation of the 
unobservable. In this case, we effectively have two probit models, one for blacks and one for 
whites. If we normalize σWII to one, then for a characteristic (Z) that affects the call-back rate, we 
identify its coefficient (δW) relative to σWII, or δW/σWII. However, if we assume that δW = δB, then 
we do not need to impose the normalization that σBII = 1, but instead can identify σBII/σWII from 
the ratio of the coefficients on Z in the probit for whites versus blacks, which in turn allows us to 
                                                 
 
16 For recent code to implement the estimator, we direct readers to the code used in Neumark et 
al. (2016), on the website of the American Economic Review (click on “Data Set” on the 
webpage at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20161008).  
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identify γ. The estimation can be done using a heteroscedastic probit model. Finally, when there 
are multiple productivity-related characteristics that shift the call-back probability Zk (k =1,…, 
K), there is an overidentification test because the ratio of coefficients on each Z, for whites 
relative to blacks, should equal σBII/σWII.17 
The heteroscedastic probit model estimates can be decomposed into the estimated 
differential due to differences in γ, and the estimated differential due to differences in the 
variance of the unobservables. In generic notation, let the latent variable depend on a vector of 
variables S and coefficients ψ, and the variance depend on a vector of variables T, which includes 
S, with coefficients θ. The elements of S are indexed by k. For a standard probit model, 
coefficient estimates are translated into estimates of the marginal effects of a continuous variable 
S using  
∂P(call-back)/∂Sk = ψkφ(Sψ)         (6) 
where Sk is the variable of interest with coefficient ψk, φ(.) is the standard normal density, and the 
standard deviation of the unobservable is normalized to one. Typically, this is evaluated at the 
means of S. When Sk is a dummy variable such as race, the difference in the cumulative normal 
distribution functions is often used instead, although the difference is usually trivial.   
The marginal effect is more complicated in the case of the heteroscedastic probit model, 
because if the variance of the unobservable differs by race, then when race “changes” both the 
variance and the level of the latent variable that determines hiring can shift. As long as we use 
the continuous version of the partial derivative to compute marginal effects from the 
                                                 
 
17 Indeed, the identifying restriction δW = δB only has to hold for subsets of the characteristics 
that shift the call-back probability, and one can rely only on this subset if the overidentification 
test for a larger set of resume characteristics fails (see Neumark, 2012). 
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heteroscedastic probit model, there is a unique decomposition of the effect of a change in a 
variable Sk that also appears in T into these two components. In particular, denoting the variance 
of the unobservable [exp(Tθ)]2, with the variables in T arranged such that the kth element of T is 
Sk, then the overall partial derivative of P(call-back) with respect to Sk is   
∂P/∂Sk = φ(Sψ/exp(Tθ)) ∙{ψk/exp(Tθ)} + φ(Sψ/exp(Tθ))∙{(–Sψ∙θk)/exp(Tθ)}.18 (7) 
The first part of the sum in equation (7) is the partial derivative with respect to changes in 
Sk affecting only the level of the latent variable – corresponding to the counterfactual of Sk 
changing the valuation of the worker without changing the variance of the unobservable. The 
second part is the partial derivative with respect to changes via the variance of the unobservable. 
In the analysis below, these two separate effects are reported as well as the overall marginal 
effect, and standard errors are calculated using the delta method.19  
This discussion raises the issue of what we are trying to measure in audit and 
correspondence studies. Focusing on γ, the structural effect of race, captures the potential 
discounting by employers of black workers’ productivity à la Becker (and possibly statistical 
discrimination about the mean of XII). But as shown, employers could treat blacks and whites 
differently in hiring because of different variances of the unobservable. If the latter is accepted as 
a meaningful measure of discrimination, we might not want to eliminate it. 
There are two reasons why the coefficient γ is the focus of interest. First, to the best of 
                                                 
 
18 See Cornelißen (2005). 
19 Because the formula for the derivative based on a continuous variable yields this unique 
decomposition, it is used below – and also to interpret the simple probit estimates, as in Table 1. 
The implied partial derivatives from the probit using the formula for a discrete variable (or 
computing the partial derivative for each sample observation and averaging, as is now more 
standard) were very similar. One can decompose the partial derivative from the heteroskedastic 
probit model based on the partial derivative for discrete variables calculated from difference in 
the cumulative normal distribution functions, but then the decomposition is not unique.  
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our knowledge, differential treatment based on assumptions (true or not) about variances have 
not been viewed as discriminatory in the legal literature. Second, and probably more important, 
the taste discrimination (and possibly “first-moment” statistical discrimination) that 
correspondence studies capture in γ generalizes from the correspondence study to the real 
economy. In contrast, the difference in treatment based on differences in the variances of 
unobservables is an artifact of the design of correspondence (or audit) studies – in particular, the 
standardization of applicants to particular, and similar, values of the observables, relative to the 
actual distribution of observables among real applicants. If, instead, a study used applicants that 
replicated the actual distribution of applicants to the employers in the study, there would be no 
bias – in the setting described here – from different variances of the unobservables. This is 
discussed in detail in Neumark (2012).   
That is not to say, however, that there cannot be discrimination based on second moments 
with, for example, risk averse firms. In that sense, one can potentially interpret the bias 
correction and decomposition not as separating out real versus spurious discrimination, but rather 
first-moment versus second-moment discrimination. We could imagine, for example, that risk-
averse firms are less likely to call back (or hire) workers with more uncertain productivity, even 
when on average they are as productive as another group. However, the potential difficulty with 
this interpretation is that we do not uniformly find that the minority group that experiences 
discrimination according to the conventional analysis generally has a higher variance of the 
unobservable; indeed, in both the labor market studies and the housing market studies we 
analyze, this is the case in just about half of the estimates. This is a further reason why, in the 
remainder of the paper, we interpret the evidence as isolating discrimination by adjusting for 
differences in the variances of unobservables.   
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Results from re-examination of field experiments with quality variation across resumes 
Labor market field experiments 
We report the results for the re-analysis of the datasets from the labor market field 
experiments in Tables 2A and 2B. Turning to the first set of labor market studies covered in 
Table 2A, we first report the estimated discrimination coefficient (γ, in the equations from above) 
in the first row of the table (Panel A). These match the estimates in the last column of Table 1, 
and have already been summarized.  
[Table 2A near here] 
Panel B turns to the heteroscedastic probit estimates that correct for biases from 
differences in the variance of unobservables. The “Controls” entry toward the bottom of the table 
lists the resume characteristics including those likely to shift the call-back rate (like education, 
skills, etc.).20 The first row of Panel B reports the overall effect from the heteroscedastic probit 
estimates. These are similar to the probit estimates. The next two rows of the table report the key 
results from the decomposition of the heteroscedastic probit estimates. The “level” effect 
(labelled “Marginal effect through level (unbiased)” in the table) is the unbiased estimate, and 
the “variance” effect reflects the bias from correspondence study design, arising because of the 
interaction between the quality of the resumes sent out (relative to the actual distribution) and 
differences in the variances of unobservables.  
                                                 
 
20 Some studies include resume characteristics that are not independent of minority group status. 
For example, Oreopoulos (2011) indicates, for some of his ethnic groups, that some education or 
experience occurred in a foreign country. This is useful for asking what might explain variation 
in the amount of discrimination immigrants face, which is the focus of his study. But it does not 
fit into the narrower question considered in this paper of discrimination against the minority 
group per se. Hence, we only use resume characteristics that are constructed to be orthogonal to 
minority group status.  
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Looking at these estimates, for the first study – the Baert et al. (2015) experiment on 
discrimination against Turkish job applicants relative to natives in Belgium – the evidence of 
discrimination completely disappears in the heteroscedastic probit estimates. In both columns (1) 
and (2) – the first for a call-back, and the second for an immediate interview – the negative and 
significant coefficient estimate on the indicator for Turkish applicants becomes positive and 
statistically insignificant. 
In contrast, the estimated effect through the variance is negative and significant, implying 
that the study design generates bias towards finding evidence of discrimination. The next row of 
the table reports that the ratio of the estimated standard deviations of the unobservables for 
minority versus non-minority candidates is around 0.5, indicating a lower variance of 
unobservables for the Turkish applicants. In terms of the model, the reduction in estimated 
discrimination coupled with a lower variance of unobservables for minorities implies that on 
average the resumes in this study were of relatively low quality compared to what employers see; 
thus, the low variance group is less likely to be of sufficiently high quality on the unobservables 
to merit a call-back, and the difference in variance creates a bias towards finding discrimination 
against Turkish applicants. 
Below the decomposition estimates, the table reports some additional diagnostic test 
results. First, it reports the p-value from the overidentification test that the ratios of the skill 
coefficients between (in this case) Turkish and native applicants are equal across all of the 
skills/resume characteristics. The p-value is 0.97 in column (1) and 0.93 in column (2), 
indicating that we do not reject the overidentifying restrictions. On the other hand, in this case, as 
reported in the next row, the data tend to reject the restriction to the homoscedastic specification; 
the p-value from a likelihood ratio test is 0.01 in column (1) and 0.10 in column (2). The final 
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test result reported is whether the ratio of variances of the unobservables equals one; this is 
rejected strongly in both columns (a result we expect would to parallel to some extent the 
likelihood ratio test). 
Thus, for the Baert et al. study, application of this method of correcting for bias from 
differences in the variances of unobservables very much overturns the evidence of ethnic 
discrimination. There is one additional point to make with reference to the more general earlier 
discussion about interpreting the effect through the variance. One might refer to the negative 
(and significant) estimates on “Marginal effect through variance” as suggesting that the evidence 
of discrimination has not gone away, but simply been “displaced” to show up in the variance. We 
have already explained why, in the context of the method and underlying model used in this 
paper, the estimated effect through the variance is an artifact of the study, and would not be 
expected to be replicated in the real world. Similarly, it would not be replicated if the study had 
used high-quality resumes, or a distribution of resumes that matched the distribution employers 
actually see. An alternative hypothesis, though, is that the effect of variance is real, and reflects 
employer risk aversion rather than how the employer evaluates the likelihood that an applicant 
exceeds a call-back/hiring threshold, given the resume. However, if there is risk aversion, then 
high-variance groups would be penalized. That is inconsistent with the evidence from the Baert 
et al. data, since the minority applicants are estimated to have lower variance.21   
Having gone through the results for the first study in detail, the results for the other labor 
                                                 
 
21 This may be too strong a statement, since if employers actually evaluate applicants based on 
their assumed variance of the unobservable, the statistical model might be different. We are not 
aware of any field experiments that have tried to incorporate risk aversion, although this might 
be fruitful. Dickinson and Oaxaca (2009) provide a lab experiment study of this type of 
discrimination in labor markets. 
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market studies can be covered more succinctly. The Carlsson and Rooth (2007) study of 
discrimination against Middle Easterners in Sweden asks a very similar question to Baert et al. 
(2015). In this case, however, the conclusions are scarcely affected by addressing the Heckman-
Siegelman critique. The estimated marginal effect through the level (−0.102) is very similar to 
the simple heteroscedastic probit estimate (−0.095), and the estimated marginal effect through 
the variance is close to zero (0.007) and estimated precisely. In this case the ratio of the 
estimated standard deviations of the unobservable for minorities relative to non-minorities is 
very close to one (1.03), which implies – in terms of the Heckman-Siegelman critique – that 
there is unlikely to be any bias regardless of the quality of the artificial resumes relative to the 
population of resumes that the employer sees, which is consistent with the robustness of the 
evidence for this study. Note also that the data do not reject the overidentifying restrictions, nor 
do they reject the restriction to the homoscedastic model or that the ratio of standard deviations 
equals one – not surprising given the estimates.   
The Drydakis (2014) study looks at discrimination against gays and lesbians. In this 
study, also, correcting for potential bias from differences in the variances of the unobservables 
does not alter the conclusion much. Indeed, the estimated effect of being gay or lesbian is larger 
negative (−0.476 or −0.499) after correcting for this bias, relative to the overall effect of −0.384 
for gays and −.304 for lesbians. For both groups, the estimated variance of the unobservable is 
quite a bit larger than for straight men or women, with a ratio of standard deviations of 1.59 for 
gay versus straight men, and 2.27 for lesbian versus straight women. The combination of a 
higher variance for gays or lesbians with a larger estimate of discrimination would imply that the 
resumes were of low quality relative to the distribution, which would lead employers to favor the 
high variance group and generate a bias towards zero in the estimate of discrimination. 
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Note that for the Drydakis analyses there is strong evidence against the homoscedastic 
probit model and marginally significant evidence against equal standard deviations. Also, for the 
analysis of gay versus straight men the overidentifying restrictions are rejected at the 10-percent 
level. This last result prompted us to estimate a less restrictive model that did not restrict the 
effects of two of the resume characteristics to be the same across gay and straight men – chosen 
based on the estimates indicating that these interactions did not fit the expected pattern if the 
coefficients in the latent variable model were equal and only the variances of the unobservables 
varied.22 In this case the overidentification restrictions were no longer rejected (the p-value was 
0.751), yet the estimates were very similar to those reported in column (5) of Table 2A.  
Lee and Khalid (2016) study discrimination against Malays (versus Chinese), in the 
private sector in Malaysia.23 In this case, the conclusions are dramatically affected by addressing 
the Heckman-Siegelman critique, as the estimated marginal effect through the level changes sign 
and becomes significant and positive – consistent with discrimination in favor of Malays.24 In 
                                                 
 
22 These were the indicators for a high-quality resume (more experience) and for resume type. 
These were chosen because the estimated signs of the interactions relative to the signs of the 
main effects were rather strongly inconsistent with what would be predicted based on the higher 
estimated variance of the unobservable for gays. Note that the model is identified as long as the 
effects of some variables that shift the call-back probability are restricted to be equal across the 
two groups; this restriction does not have to hold for all of them, and can be relaxed by adding 
interactions between the group indicator and the resume characteristic to the heteroscedastic 
probit model. 
23 Malays are not the minority group, although we retain that label in the table to be consistent 
with other studies. Lee and Khalid (2016) discuss issues related to potential discrimination 
against Malays in the private sector, including affirmative action for Malays in public education 
that may lead Malay graduates to be less preferred. Their sample size with controls is a bit 
smaller than ours (see their Table 4), because they also include data on the companies in the 
study; these data are not always available, and the company data were not provided to us.   
24 While this change in results is striking, there are also findings in the Lee and Khalid paper that 
do not cleanly fit the expected story of discrimination against Malays. In particular, they find 
stronger anti-Malay discrimination in hiring for private university graduates, where affirmative 
action in education is not implemented.   
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contrast, the estimated marginal effect through the variance is large, negative, and significant 
(−0.445). In this case the ratio of the estimated standard deviations of the unobservable for 
Malays relative to Chinese is very low (0.11). The combination of a lower variance for Malays 
with a smaller (indeed, opposite-signed) estimate of discrimination would imply that the resumes 
were of low quality relative to the distribution for jobs included in the study, which would lead 
employers to favor the high variance group and generate a bias towards discrimination in favor 
of Chinese applicants. Note also that the data do not reject the overidentifying restrictions.   
Turning to the remaining labor market studies, in Table 2B, Oreopoulos (2011) studies 
outcomes for six immigrant groups relative to native Canadians. It turns out that for two of these 
groups – Chinese and Indian – the evidence of discrimination remains significant after 
addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique, and is actually stronger, with estimates changing 
from around −0.05 to −0.10 or greater. For both groups, the estimated variance of the 
unobservable is larger for immigrants than for natives, which appears to interact with the 
applicants being low quality so that the higher variance biases the estimate of discrimination 
from the standard probit towards zero. In contrast, for the other four groups – Chinese-
Canadian,25 Pakistani, Greek, and British – there is no longer significant evidence of 
discrimination. Note that in two cases – Pakistani and Greek – the point estimate of the marginal 
effect of minority group membership through the level is still a large negative number, but is 
insignificant. In contrast, for the British, the point estimate is no longer negative.  
[Table 2B near here] 
Turning to the other diagnostics, in every case for the Oreopoulos analysis, the 
                                                 
 
25 This refers to an English first name and a Chinese last name.   
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overidentification restrictions are not rejected. Similarly, with the exceptions of the analysis for 
the Chinese applicants, the data do not reject the restriction to the homoscedastic model. Thus, in 
this case we are sometimes failing to find evidence of discrimination because we are estimating a 
more flexible model even when the data do not reject a more restrictive model that provides 
evidence of discrimination – and the results for the Pakistani and Greek applicants are notable in 
this regard. This poses the usual trade-off of bias versus precision, although generally speaking 
labor economists are willing to estimate less restrictive models that eliminate bias at the risk of 
decreased precision. Regardless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the re-analysis of the 
Oreopoulos data indicates far less robust evidence of discrimination than the original study.  
Finally, column (7) of Table 2B repeats the re-analysis of the Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2004) data from Neumark (2012). In this case, the evidence of discrimination gets a bit stronger, 
and the variance of the unobservable is estimated to be larger for blacks. These findings are 
consistent with low quality resumes generating a bias against finding discrimination, although 
the qualitative conclusions are unchanged.  
Thus, the conclusion from our re-examination of the labor market experiments is that the 
findings from the existing studies of discrimination against ethnic, racial, or sexual orientation 
minorities are not always robust to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique. All 14 estimates 
based on the existing studies, using the conventional approach, point to evidence of 
discrimination. But only six (or just under one-half) of the corrected estimates provide evidence 
of discrimination.26 
                                                 
 
26 This includes the evidence from Carlsson and Rooth (2007), Drydakis (2014, for both gays 
and lesbians), Oreopoulos (2011, for Chinese and Indian), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004, 
significant at 10-percent level). 
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This conclusion that the analysis of data from field experiments on labor market 
discrimination is not always robust is echoed in the findings reported in Neumark et al. (2016). 
They study age discrimination in hiring, and find that the evidence of discrimination against 
older women is robust to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique, but the evidence of 
discrimination against older men is not robust. On the other hand, some other recent papers using 
this technique do not find large differences. Carlsson et al. (2013) re-examine data from four 
previous studies of the Swedish labor market, each of which includes some form of the data 
required to implement the bias correction. Their re-analysis does not lead to large changes in the 
estimates of discrimination, although sometimes the estimated discrimination (against those with 
Arabic names, and in favor of women) becomes smaller. Three recent studies by Baert, all on the 
Belgian labor market, found no change in the estimates of discrimination in these experimental 
studies. Baert (2015) implemented this method in a study of sex discrimination in Belgium for 
jobs entailing a promotion, using information on distance from the worker’s residence to the 
workplace to identify the heteroscedastic probit model, and reports that this correction does not 
alter the conclusions (although the estimated effect of discrimination does become smaller and 
statistically insignificant).27  Baert (2014) applied the bias correction in an investigation of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and family responsibilities, and found no bias or 
difference in reported results (Baert, 2014, footnote 15, p. 551). Baert (2016) found similar 
results in a study of hiring discrimination against disabled individuals (see pp. 83-84). Nunley et 
al.  (2015) studied racial discrimination in hiring of recent college graduates in the United States. 
                                                 
 
27 Baert et al. (2016) use these same data, but do not include the bias correction.  Since the data 
were used in the 2015 paper to do the bias correction, these data are not included in our re-
analysis.   
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Applying the bias correction to their finding of a significant, lower interview rate to black 
graduates indicated that the baseline estimate of discrimination was understated, although the 
resulting estimated marginal effects through the level and variance were not statistically 
significant (p. 1118). Thus, among these latter studies, there is again sometimes an indication 
that the results are not robust to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique, although there is 
less clear of an indication that ignoring this critique leads to overstating discrimination.    
Housing market field experiments 
The results from the re-examination of the evidence from the housing discrimination 
studies are presented in Table 3. Ahmed et al. (2010) study discrimination against Arab 
applicants in Sweden, looking – as three of the four housing studies do – at both positive 
responses and offers of immediate showings. In this study, correcting for potential bias from 
differences in the variances of the unobservables does very little to change the conclusions. The 
estimates of lower positive responses or offers of immediate showings to Arab applicants 
become if anything more negative – most notably for immediate showing, where the estimate 
changes from −0.074 to −0.146 – and both estimates are statistically significant. The estimated 
effects of Arab ethnicity through the variance are positive, and larger for immediate showings, 
corresponding to the larger negative estimate on the marginal effect through the level. The 
estimated variance of the unobservable is larger for Arab applicants, so combined, the estimates 
imply that the applications were lower quality than the population of applications to these 
landlords, biasing towards zero the conventional probit estimate of discrimination in immediate 
showings. Turning to the other diagnostics, in neither analysis are the overidentification 
restrictions, the restriction to a homoscedastic probit model, or equality of the standard 
deviations rejected. Thus, in this study evidence of discrimination persists.  
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[Table 3 near here] 
These same conclusions are echoed in the remaining columns of the table – for the Bosch 
et al. (2010), Carlsson and Eriksson (2007), and Ewens et al. (2014) studies. In all cases, the 
bias-corrected estimates still lead to statistically significant evidence of discrimination based on 
race and ethnicity. And in most cases the point estimate for the marginal effect through the level 
is very close to the overall heteroscedastic probit estimate, while the estimates of the effect of 
race or ethnicity through the variance are very small.28   
There is one case (Ewens et al., 2014) where the overidentifying restrictions are rejected 
at the 10-percent level (and the p-values for the other tests are fairly low). We therefore carried 
out an additional analysis, paralleling what we did with the Drydakis (2014) data on gay and 
straight male applicants. In this case, we estimated a less restrictive model that did not restrict the 
effects of percent black in the area or city to be the same across black and white applicants, 
based on the estimates indicating that these interactions did not fit the pattern of equal 
coefficients in the latent variable model with probit coefficient differing because of differences 
in the variances of unobservables. In this case the overidentification restrictions were no longer 
rejected (the p-value was 0.877), yet the conclusions were similar to those in column (7) of Table 
3. The overall estimate (standard error) of discrimination from the heteroscedastic probit model 
was −0.064 (0.023), and the unbiased estimated effect through the level was −0.067 (0.023).  
                                                 
 
28 One reason for the robustness of the results in Carlsson and Eriksson (2013) could be because 
they use applications with substantial variation in applicant characteristics. The authors do this 
because by avoiding standardizing applicants to a very narrow range, the bias identified by the 
Heckman-Siegelman critique can be reduced, although this cannot ensure that the range of 
quality of actual applicants is not larger. It is also the case that – especially for the positive 
response outcome – the variances are nearly equal (the ratio of estimated standard deviations is 
1.02), so that using a narrow range of applicant quality would not introduce bias.   
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Thus, the conclusion from our re-examination of the housing market studies is that the 
findings from the existing studies of discrimination against ethnic or racial minorities are robust 
to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique. With one minor exception, these past studies 
found evidence of discrimination, and our corrected estimates are qualitatively and usually 
quantitatively very similar.  
Why might the housing market tests of callback for rental enquiries be more robust to 
addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique? One possibility is that that the information 
provided in the housing market tests is sufficiently complete that there is little scope for a role 
for unobservables, and hence little impact of any differences in the variance of unobservables 
across groups. In housing markets, there may not be much more that matters to agents than 
ability to pay, and the information in the applications may convey this quite reliably. In contrast, 
an employer has an ongoing relationship with a worker, as do the employer’s customers, so that 
many factors that are not conveyed in an on-line job application could potentially weigh on an 
employer’s decision, and hence, correspondingly, differences in the variances of these 
unobserved factors across groups could matter much more.   
Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to re-examine evidence from field experiments on labor 
market and housing market discrimination (experiments that, in general, identify the combined 
effect of taste discrimination and statistical discrimination). Specifically, our goal is to see if the 
near-uniform findings of discrimination against minorities hold up after correcting for an 
important source of bias originally identified in Heckman and Siegelman (1993) – which we 
refer to as the “Heckman-Siegelman critique.” This critique emphasises that even under quite 
ideal conditions for these studies, the evidence can be biased in either direction – or, 
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equivalently, discrimination can be unidentified – if the variances of the unobservables differ 
across the groups studied. This is a plausible concern, given that a difference in the variances of 
unobservables across groups cannot be cannot be ruled out and indeed is at the core of early 
theoretical models of statistical discrimination (Aigner and Cain, 1977). We re-examine 
evidence from 10 studies that have the requisite data – applicant or other characteristics aside 
from the identifier for the group in question which shift the probability of call-backs or hires – 
implementing a correction for this bias proposed in Neumark (2012).  
We find that for the housing market studies, the estimated effect of discrimination is 
robust to this correction. For the labor market studies, in contrast, the evidence is less robust; in 
about half of cases the estimated effect of discrimination either falls to near zero or becomes 
statistically insignificant, and in one case the sign changes.  
We of course cannot definitively extrapolate from the 10 studies we were able to re-
examine to the broader set of field experiments on discrimination by race, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation. However, given that about half of the estimates of labor market discrimination that 
we could re-examine no longer provide statistical evidence of discrimination (or discrimination 
in the same direction) after correcting for bias from differences in the variance of unobservables, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that the overall (and overwhelming) evidence of labor market 
discrimination from field experiments is likely less robust than it seems. We have no doubt that 
in many countries there is discrimination in labor and housing markets against many groups, and 
that – like the subset of studies we re-examine in this paper – the evidence of discrimination 
would frequently be robust to addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique. But our evidence also 
indicates that in some cases a research design that enables a researcher to address this critique 
would not find evidence of labor market discrimination.  
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If nothing else, this conclusion implies that we need three types of research to draw more 
definitive conclusions from field experiments on labor and housing market discrimination: (1) 
more evidence using this kind of research design and methods; (2) more analysis of how best to 
implement these methods, what kinds of quality shifters provide the most informative estimates, 
etc.; and (3) further consideration of whether there are other ways to address the Heckman-
Siegelman critique and whether they generate similar answers. Moreover, given the non-
robustness of the experimental evidence on labor market discrimination, in particular, to 
addressing the Heckman-Siegelman critique, one could reasonably argue that future 
experimental studies of labor market discrimination (and perhaps of discrimination in any 
market) must take account of this critique to be regarded as credible. 
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Table 1: Experimental Studies of Discrimination in Labor and Housing Markets Re-examined 
Study Country Years Minority Outcome 
Majority 
call-back 
rate 
Estimated 
differential for 
minority 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Labor market field experiments 
Baert et al. (2015) Belgium 2011-12 Turkish Call-back .329 -.082 
(.034) 
    Immediate 
interview 
.190 -.056 
(.026) 
Carlsson and 
Rooth (2007) 
Sweden 2005-6 Middle 
Eastern 
Call-back .269 -.095 
(.009) 
Drydakis (2014) Cyprus 2010-11 Gay Call-back .554 -.410 
(.010) 
   Lesbian Call-back .523 -.411 
(.011) 
Lee and Khalid 
(2016) 
Malaysia 2011 Malay (vs. 
Chinese) 
Call-back .222 -.152 
(.018) 
Oreopoulos 
(2009) 
Canada 2008 Chinese Call-back .142 -.053 
(.007) 
   Indian Call-back .142 -.056 
(.007) 
   Chinese-
Canadian 
Call-back .142 -.063 
(.008) 
   Pakistani Call-back .142 -.073 
(.009) 
   Greek Call-back .142 -.035 
(.017) 
   British Call-back .142 -.031 
(.011) 
Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 
(2004) 
United 
States 
2001-2 Black-
sounding 
names 
Call-back .097 -.030 
(.006) 
B. Housing market field experiments 
Ahmed et al. 
(2010) 
Sweden 2008 Arab/Muslim Positive 
response 
.514 -.171 
(.033) 
    Immediate 
showing 
.254 -.091 
(.024) 
Bosch et al. 
(2010) 
Spain 2009 Moroccan 
immigrants 
Positive 
response 
.590 -.133 
(.014) 
    Immediate 
showing 
.541 -.135 
(.014) 
Carlsson and 
Eriksson (2014) 
Sweden 2010-11 Arab Positive 
response 
.387 -.130 
(.012) 
    Immediate 
showing 
.271 -.110 
(.011) 
Ewens et al. 
(2014) 
United 
States 
2009 Black Positive 
response 
.503 -.090 
(.019) 
Notes: All studies are correspondence studies. Column (7) reports marginal effect from probit models, our 
estimates, from following tables. In the Oreopoulos study, “Chinese-Canadian” means there was an English 
first name.   
 
 
 
 
Table 2A: Estimates for Labor Market Discrimination Studies: Full Specifications 
Study Baert et al. (2015),  
Belgium 
Carlsson and Rooth (2007), 
Sweden 
Drydakis (2014), 
Cyprus 
Lee and Khalid (2016) 
Malaysia 
Outcome Call-back Immed. interview Call-back Call-back Call-back 
Minority group  Turkish, males Middle Eastern, males Gay Lesbian Malay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Estimates from basic probit       
Minority, marginal effect -.082 
(.034) 
-.056 
(.026) 
-.095 
(.009) 
-.410 
(.010) 
-.411 
(.011) 
-.152 
(.018) 
B. Heteroscedastic probit model       
Minority, marginal effect  -.096 
(.034) 
-.072 
(.028) 
-.095 
(.009) 
-.384 
(.040) 
-.304 
(.091) 
-.201 
(.038) 
Marginal effect through level 
(unbiased)  
.044 
(.068) 
.073 
(.087) 
-.102 
(.024) 
-.476 
(.029) 
-.499 
(.016) 
.244 
(.108) 
Marginal effect through variance -.141 
(.065) 
-.145 
(.093) 
.007 
(.026) 
.093 
(.065) 
.195 
(.104) 
-.445 
(.142) 
Standard deviation of 
unobservables, minority/non-
minority 
.49 .55 1.03 1.59 2.27 .11 
Wald test, overidentification, ratios of 
coefficients equal (p-value) 
.97 .93 .87 .09 .64 .94 
LR test: standard vs. heteroscedastic 
probit (p-value)  
.01 .10 .80 .06 .01 .01 
Wald test, ratio of standard deviations 
= 1 (p-value) 
.00 .03 .79 .18 .16 .00 
Controls (jobs or applicants) High education, over-educated, 
distance, vacancy duration, 
vacancies/unemployed, unemployment, 
% foreign, % Turkish, city, multiple 
jobs, average occupation wage, job 
quality,  intensive/moderate customer 
contact 
Unemployment spells, cultural 
activities, sport, personality, 
summer experiences, U.S. high 
school, high education, multiple 
employers, occupation 
Enhanced cover 
letters, enhanced 
reference letters, first 
applicant, resume 
type, reference type, 
tester, occupation 
Occupation, cover letter with 
good English, extracurricular 
skills, BA from private 
university, grades, language 
and writing skills stated 
(Malay, Chinese), MS Office, 
software/accounting skills, 
high quality CV, degree or 
degree project on CV, pre-
university institution, job ad 
stated race 
Clustered (within-pair design) Yes Yes Yes  
N 736 736 5,636 4,846 4,194 3,009 
Notes: In Panel A, the marginal effect is based on the standard formula for a discrete variable, with other variables set at sample means. In Panel B, the continuous 
approximation for marginal effects is used, with the decomposition in equation (8) immediately below. The standard errors for the two components of the marginal 
effects are computed using the delta method. The only individual controls for which interactions are not introduced are for other demographic groups. 
  
 
 
 
Table 2B: Estimates for Labor Market Discrimination Studies: Full Specifications 
Study  Oreopoulos (2011), Canada Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), U.S. 
Outcome Call-back Call-back 
Minority group  
Chinese Indian 
Chinese-
Canadian Pakistani Greek British 
Black-sounding names 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. Estimates from basic probit        
Minority, marginal effect -.053 
(.007) 
-.056 
(.007) 
-.063 
(.008) 
-.073 
(.009) 
-.035 
(.017) 
-.031 
(.011) 
-.030 
(.006) 
B. Heteroscedastic probit model        
Minority, marginal effect  -.046 
(.009) 
-.050 
(.008) 
-.068 
(.009) 
-.083 
(.014) 
-.066 
(.073) 
-.038 
(.013) 
-.026 
(.007) 
Marginal effect through level 
(unbiased)   
-.131 
(.046) 
-.101 
(.041) 
-.029 
(.054) 
-.076 
(.078) 
-.169 
(.208) 
.031 
(.045) 
-.070 
(.040) 
Marginal effect through variance .086 
(.052) 
.052 
(.046) 
-.040 
(.054) 
-.007 
(.070) 
.102 
(.139) 
-.068 
(.052) 
.045 
(.043) 
Standard deviation of unobservables, 
minority/non-minority 
1.46 1.26 .84 .97 1.54 .75 1.26 
Wald test, overidentification, ratios of 
coefficients equal (p-value) 
.72 .85 .78 .48 .66 .20 .42 
LR test: standard vs. heteroscedastic 
probit (p-value)  
.07 .22 .46 .92 .33 .21 .27 
        
Wald test, ratio of standard deviations 
= 1 (p-value) 
.19 .32 .42 .92 .55 .13 .37 
Controls (job or applicants) Extracurricular activities, top-ranked Bachelor’s, Master’s, 
occupation, speaking/social/writing skills required, female 
Bachelor’s, experience and  square, 
volunteer, military service, email address, 
gaps in work history, work during school, 
academic honors, computer and  other 
skills, female; in zip code (% high school 
dropout, college graduate, black, and 
white, log median household income) 
Clustered (within-pair design) Yes Yes 
N 5,866 6,373 4,468 3,978 3,388 3,934 4,784 
Notes: In Panel A, the marginal effect is based on the standard formula for a discrete variable, with other variables set at sample means. In Panel B, the 
continuous approximation for marginal effects is used, with the decomposition in equation (8) immediately below. The standard errors for the two 
components of the marginal effects are computed using the delta method. The only individual controls for which interactions are not introduced are for 
other demographic groups. Some skills are specific to immigrant groups and used to distinguish among immigrants (such as specific language fluencies 
or where experience obtained), and are not included.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimates for Housing Discrimination Studies 
Study Ahmed et al. (2010), 
Sweden 
Bosch et al. (2010), Spain Carlsson and Eriksson 
(2007), Sweden 
Ewens et al. (2014), U.S. 
Outcome Positive 
response 
Immediate 
showing 
Positive 
response 
Immediate 
showing 
Positive 
response 
Immediate 
showing 
Positive response 
Minority group  Arab/Muslim Moroccan immigrants Arabic/Muslim Black 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)    
A. Estimates from basic probit        
Minority, marginal effect -.171 
(.033) 
-.091 
(.024) 
-.133 
(.014) 
-.135 
(.014) 
-.130 
(.012) 
-.110 
(.011) 
-.090 
(.019) 
B. Heteroscedastic probit model        
Minority, marginal effect  -.165 
(.034) 
-.074 
(.027) 
-.136 
(.017) 
-.136 
(.017) 
-.131 
(.013) 
-.113 
(.011) 
-.089 
(.019) 
Marginal effect through level 
(unbiased)  
-.182 
(.035) 
-.146 
(.049) 
-.136 
(.018) 
-.135 
(.015) 
-.134 
(.026) 
-.074 
(.034) 
-.092 
(.019) 
Marginal effect through variance .017 
(.019) 
.072 
(.058) 
.001 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.014) 
.004 
(.025) 
-.039 
(.035) 
.003 
(.003) 
Standard deviation of 
unobservables, minority/non-
minority 
1.20 1.35 .91 .98 1.02 .85 1.08 
Wald test, overidentification, ratios 
of coefficients equal (p-value) 
.59 .91 .33 .52 .87 .93 .07 
LR test: standard vs. 
heteroscedastic probit (p-value)  
.32 .20 .74 .95 .88 .26 .18 
Wald test, ratio of standard 
deviations = 1 (p-value) 
.37 .29 .74 .95 .89 
 
.22 .20 
Controls (area or applicants) Enhanced application, rent, 
space, rooms, metro, 
company 
Enhanced application, rent, 
rooms, urban, company, 
female 
Jobs, exercise, nightclub, 
smoker, references, female, 
age 
Mother’s estimated 
education, positive email, 
negative email, rent, 
relative rent, rent in area, 
one BR, cost, % male, % 
black in area/city, female, 
Muslim name 
Clustered (within-pair design) No Yes No No 
N 959 959 4,716 4,716 5,827 5,827 13,800 
Notes: In Panel A, the marginal effect is based on the standard formula for a discrete variable, with other variables set at sample means. In Panel B, the 
continuous approximation for marginal effects is used, with the decomposition in equation (8) immediately below. The standard errors for the two components of 
the marginal effects are computed using the delta method. The only individual controls for which interactions are not introduced are for other demographic 
groups. 
